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Abstract
In line with the theoretical premises of the research, the aim of this paper is two-fold: firstl , to determine whether there are
different patterns of advanced manufacturing technology (AMT) investment behavior in the Andalusian aeronautical industry
that can be associated with different technology strategies, as in other sectors and geographical areas and, secondly, to identify
possible similarities or differences from previous research, such as Boyer et al. [J. OperationsManage. 14 (4) (1996) 297–313]
and Jonsson [Int. J. Operations ProductionManage. 20 (12) (2000) 1446–1474]. A survey of the 20 plants in the populationwas
conducted via postal questionnaire between July 1999 and April 2001, with a structured interview being held at a later date. A
cluster analysis was performedwhich allowed a taxonomywith three groups of plants to be established: traditionalists, design-
ers and investors. These three groups differ from each other with regard to their AMT investments, industrial activity, size and
degree of integration. Differences between the groups in company performance cannot be appreciated. Although the results
apparently seem to back upmost of the finding of previousworks biased to larger companies, they do bring certain aspects into
question regarding the explanation for the way the groups are formed. The three critical factors which determine AMT invest-
ment in the sector are the company’s being of a certain minimum size, undergoing a period of expansion, and type of activity.
© 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
There have been various studies (Lefebvre et al.,
1992; Chen, 1996) that demonstrated the inadequacy
of Porter’s (1987) basic strategies for dealing with
technological strategies and, in particular, advanced
manufacturing technology (AMT) investment strate-
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gies. An alternative approach is the development of
taxonomies that may provide strategic configuration
with a discriminatory ability by establishing groups of
companies that share a number of common character-
istics, attributes or relationships (Boyer et al., 1996;
Jonsson, 2000).
In the present study, we firs aim to identify a
taxonomy define by the different patterns of invest-
ment in AMT followed by companies—mostly small-
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)—in a specifi
industrial sector, located in a pre-determined geo-
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Fig. 1. Theoretical model.
graphical zone. We shall specificall consider the
aeronautical sector in Andalusia, southern Spain,1 for
the period July 1999 to April 2001. This leads us on
to the second objective of this research, which is to
identify any possible similarities and differences from
previous studies and the reasons for these.
The working hypotheses put forward to explain the
reasons why the different groups are formed point in
two directions. Firstly, there is the influenc that a
variety of different factors (activity, size, competitive
priorities, and information and catalyst elements) may
have on these patterns. Secondly, there are possible
differences between groups with respect to the level
to which their activities and company performance
are integrated. A graphical representation of the theo-
retical model incorporating these relationships can be
found in Fig. 1. There has been scant analysis of the
effect had by competitive priorities in previous stud-
ies, and we are not aware of any analysis that links
information and catalyst elements with levels of AMT
investment. The third objective we have therefore set
for ourselves is the provision of new data not found
in previous works, albeit in an exploratory phase and
with no view to generalization.
Various factors led us to conclude that conducting
an empirical analysis into the Andalusian aeronau-
1 Only the construction of aeroplanes should be understood here,
as there are no aerospace activities in the region, which is why
the use of the term ‘aerospace’ has been avoided.
tical sector was particularly interesting and oppor-
tune. Firstly, this sector is strategically important, not
only for Andalusian industry, but also for Spain’s
and the European Union’s as a whole; secondly, it
is extremely technologically-intensive and as such
is a potential user of a wide and diverse range of
AMT; thirdly, it was an inducement that this sec-
tor had not previously been the subject of many
specifi scientifi studies into AMT management. Fi-
nally, the companies in the sector are, for the main
part, small- and medium-sized, with 40% having
a workforce of under 50 employees. We therefore
thought our study could contribute to mitigating the
lack of research aimed at identifying investment tax-
onomies for smaller plants; as we shall see, existing
work has thus far been highly biased towards larger
companies. The Andalusian aeronautical industry
includes a number of Construcciones Aeronáuti-
cas S.A. (CASA) manufacturing plants. CASA, the
Spanish national aeronautical company, has been a
member of the Airbus Consortium since 1971 and of
the European Aeronautic, Defense and Space Com-
pany (EADS) since its creation in 2000. The sector
also includes a number of SME ancillary firm with
customers who number not only other Spanish aero-
nautical companies, such as CASA itself, but also
foreign companies, such as Boeing. According to
statements made by the President of Boeing Europe,
Richard L. James, in 1999, in the Seville area alone
there were more than fi e companies manufacturing
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no fewer than 3500 different parts for the Boeing
717.
It was always considered imperative to include the
CASA group factories in the analysis. On the one
hand, this was a prime necessity if the whole popula-
tion were to be studied, and, on the other, it allowed
a clear company size distinction to be made. The fact
that all the factories belonged to the same group does
not distort the results, as CASA was not part of EADS
at the time of our study. Furthermore, each of the
group’s factories devised its technology strategy inde-
pendently from the others, not only as far as the choice
of equipment is concerned, but also with respect to
the equipment evaluation process, even though the fi
nal choice was subject to approval by Head Offic (as
confirme by the Heads of the Engineering Depart-
ments that we consulted).
Section 2 reviews literature in order to establish
what the possible advantages associated with the use
of taxonomies are, as well as to identify the theoret-
ical parameters on the basis of which our hypothe-
ses can be formulated. The hypotheses are set out in
Section 3, and in Section 4, they are tested empirically.
In Section 5, the results are analyzed and discussed.
Finally, in Section 6, conclusions are drawn and pos-
sible future lines of research are proposed.
2. Literature review
The purpose of taxonomies, unlike typologies, is
not to defin company ideals, but rather to classify or-
ganizations into comprehensive or mutually exclusive
groups (Doty and Glick, 1994) that provide a multidi-
mensional vision of the organizations studied (Bozarth
and McDermott, 1998). The usefulness and applica-
bility of this approach in the area of operations has
been demonstrated in a special issue of the Journal of
Operations Management (Boyer et al., 2000).
In Table 1, a summarized list can be found of some
of the studies devoted to developing taxonomies for
company strategies in which the relevant technology
is explicitly considered. From a study of 100 multi-
national companies, Stobaugh and Telesio (1983)
developed a taxonomy of three operations strategies:
technology-driven, marketing-intensive and low-cost.
Some years later, Roth and Miller (1992) (cited in
Harrison, 1995), identifie three groups of companies
Table 1
Technology strategy taxonomies
Authors (year) Proposed groups
Stobaugh and Telesio
(1983)
Technology-driven,
marketing-intensive and low-cost
Roth and Miller (1992) Weaklings, middlemen and
superstars
Miller and Roth (1994) Caretakers, marketers and
innovators
Harrison (1995) Weak competitors, middlemen
and strong competitors
differentiated by their manufacturing capabilities,
which they designated as weaklings, middlemen and
superstars. In a subsequent study, Miller and Roth
(1994) proposed a new taxonomy for operations
strategies in which three groups of companies may
again be distinguished, designating them as caretak-
ers, marketers and innovators. In research conducted
into more than 100 Australian companies, Harrison
(1995) identifie a taxonomy with three differentiated
groups according to their manufacturing capability,
specifying them as weak competitors, middlemen and
strong competitors.
Relevant literature dealing with an analysis of AMT
investment patterns is fairly recent and still relatively
scarce. There are, however, two articles especially de-
voted to the subject. The firs is a study by Boyer
et al. published in 1996; the second is by Jonsson
and was published in 2000. Boyer et al. (1996) con-
ducted an empirical study based on a sample of 202
US metal-working companies and took for the pur-
poses of analysis three basic types of AMT: design,
manufacturing and administrative. A cluster analysis
was performed and enabled the companies to be clas-
sifie into four differentiated groups according to their
investment patterns: traditionalists, generalists, high
investors and designers.
The traditionalist group, made up of a large propor-
tion of the companies, is characterized by the fact that
it does not undertake any big investments in advanced
design, manufacturing or administration technologies,
apparently preferring to place its trust in more con-
ventional technologies. The generalist companies are
thus called because they make substantial investments
in all three types of AMT technologies, although not
to the same degree as the high investors. This latter
group is at the forefront of investment in advanced
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Table 2
AMT investment taxonomy (from information in Boyer et al., 1996)
(1) Traditionalists (2) Generalists (3) High investors (4) Designers
Design [2, 3, 4] [1, 3, 4] [1, 2, 4] [1, 2, 3]
Manufacturing [2, 3, 4] [1, 3, 4] [1, 2, 4] [1, 2, 3]
Administrative [2, 3, 4] [1, 3, 4] [1, 2, 4] [1, 2, 3]
Size [3] [1]
Activity No differences No differences No differences No differences
Integration [2, 3] [1, 3, 4] [1, 2, 4] [2, 3]
Performance No differences No differences No differences No differences
Numbers in brackets indicate other groups that have significantl differing results.
design, manufacturing and administration tech-
nologies, and is at the top end of a continuum
in AMT investment. Finally, designer companies
make significan investments in design technologies;
however, their investments in manufacturing and
administrative-based AMT are at the same low level
as traditionalist companies. A summary of the results
showing relationships between the different variables
analyzed and the four clusters can be found in Table 2.
On the basis of this study, Jonsson (2000) studied a
sample of 324 companies in the metal product process-
ing sector in Sweden. The novelty in this case is that
integration is utilized as one of the variables on which
the taxonomy itself is constructed. Integration is mea-
sured through two factors: the degree of automation
for data transaction between different manufacturing
activities (for example, between product design and
manufacture) and the degree of automation for data
transaction between the various functional areas of the
company (for example, between marketing and engi-
neering, or between personnel and manufacturing). In
a cluster analysis based on performance three groups
of companies were distinguished; these were desig-
nated by the author as traditionalists, hard integrators
and high investors. The traditionalist companies are
those that present the lowest investments in the three
types of AMT. Compared to the other two groups they
show a particularly low degree of integration. The hard
integrators account for the second highest mean val-
ues in investment and in degree of integration; in rela-
tive terms, their level of integration seems to be fairly
high, even compared with the high investors. Their in-
vestments in administrative AMT are higher than in
design or manufacturing. Lastly, high investor compa-
nies both make the largest investments in AMT and
have the highest degree of integration, although the
mean values for the variables (around four out of a
maximum of seven) do not reflec exceptionally high
investments in AMT. A summary of the results ob-
tained can be found in Table 3.
There appear to be clear similarities between the
two taxonomies in some of the factors that our study
takes into consideration (see Fig. 1), which is a reflec
tion of the degree of correspondence in the two stud-
ies between the traditionalists and high investors on
the one hand, and the generalist and hard integrator
groups, on the other. The most obvious differentiat-
ing feature between the two groupings is the absence
of a designer group in Jonsson’s (2000) taxonomy. It
should also be noted that, in the results of this latter
study, a difference in performance can be appreciated
between the different groups, with the high investors
achieving the highest performance.
As previously stated, one of our aims is to identify
possible similarities or differences between the groups
that emerge in our study and those of previous works.
As the plants in the population analyzed are, for the
main part, small- or medium-sized, with many of them
being quite small indeed, it would seem reasonable to
assume that the groups define therein would not be
the same as those observed in other studies which were
based on samples of relatively large-sized companies.
In Boyer et al. (1996), the sample is clearly biased
towards larger plants (both in number of employees
and sales). This was due in part to the decision to
exclude very small plants (fewer than 50 employees)
from the studies. Jonsson (2000) also excluded these
plants (fewer than 50 employees) as not having the
necessary resources to invest in AMT. In our opinion,
the exclusion of plants of this type has at least two
important effects. It must be taken into account that
in many geographical areas it is the smallest factories
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Table 3
AMT investment taxonomy (from information in Jonsson, 2000)
(1) Traditionalists (2) Hard integrators (3) High investors
Design [2, 3] [1, 3] [1, 2]
Manufacturing [2, 3] [1, 3] [1, 2]
Administrative [2, 3] [1, 3] [1, 2]
Integration [2, 3] [1, 3] [1, 2]
Size [3] [3] [1, 2]
Activity No differences No differences No differences
Number of competitors No differences No differences No differences
Environmental uncertainty No differences No differences No differences
Business strategy
Quality differentiation [2, 3] [1] [1]
Market differentiation [2, 3] [1] [1]
Delivery differentiation [2, 3] [1] [1]
Focus [3] [1]
Low price No differences No differences No differences
Manufacturing capabilities [2, 3] [1] [1]
Most infrastructure aspects [2, 3] [1] [1]
Maintenance management
Preventive and soft [2, 3] [1] [1]
Hard [2, 3] [1, 3] [1, 2]
Profi [3] [3] [1, 2]
Growth [3] [1]
Numbers in brackets indicate other groups that have significantl differing results.
that most contribute to the creation of work and
wealth in relative terms, and, as such, they should not
be ignored in research. In Europe, for example, the
percentage of manufacturing companies with fewer
than 50 workers stands at 95.37% (Eurostat, 1999).2
Although these companies will clearly not be able to
acquire certain high-cost AMT resources, we think
it would be excessive to consider them unable to
acquire other, much more affordable AMT. In fact,
Swamidass and Kotha (1998) found that the positive
relationship between size and advanced manufactur-
ing technology depends on the AMT in question. The
non-inclusion of these companies would therefore
mean that it could not be demonstrated whether the
smallest companies behave in different ways when
investing in AMT, and also prevent other factors that
might motivate said investments being discovered.
Once the different groups have been identified we
shall try to provide new evidence on those aspects in
which the results of Boyer et al. (1996) and Jonsson
2 Statistical Offic of the European Communities. Latest avail-
able data.
(2000) differ from each other. We firs intend to dis-
cover whether a differentiated group of designer com-
panies does in fact exist, as this would, in turn, sug-
gest a differentiated technology strategy. Secondly, we
shall try to fin out whether the different strategies of
investment in AMT result in differences in investment
performance. Finally, for our groupings we shall take
into account some factors to which little consideration
has been shown in other works, such as the effect of
competitive priorities and a number of other factors
that act as catalysts for investments.
3. Working hypotheses
The foregoing discussion of the literature leads us
to the firs and second questions to be posed, which
are, as outlined above, linked to the firs two objectives
of our work: (1) Are there, as found in other sectors
and geographical areas, different patterns of company
AMT investment behavior in the Andalusian aeronau-
tical sector? (2)What are the possible similarities with,
or differences from, previous studies?
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To construct the taxonomy, we have followed the
recommendations of various authors (Ketchen and
Shook, 1996; Miller, 1996) about which variables
should be used to obtain the groupings; these should
be chosen carefully on the basis of existing theory
and according to the type of study intended. In view
of this, we decided to perform a cluster analysis tak-
ing into account only the investments made in the
different types of AMT and with the premise that An-
dalusian aeronautical sector plants can be classifie
into separate groups in accordance with their relative
commitment to each type of AMT. We did not con-
sider it appropriate to include integration as a variable
for the construction of the taxonomy, as is proposed
in the paper by Jonsson (2000). On the contrary, we
decided to leave integration as an exogenous control
variable, in line with Boyer et al. (1996), whose tax-
onomy is, in our opinion, clearer with respect to the
patterns of investment obtained. Integration is, a pri-
ori, considered to be dependent upon the previously
indicated variables and, from our point-of-view, its
inclusion as yet another variable may distort the sim-
ilarities between companies that enable the formation
of groups that are already fairly well differentiated
from each other by their investments in the various
AMT options available.
To explain the reasons why the different groups
are formed, we shall firs concentrate on the influ
ence that might be exerted on investments by a num-
ber of explanatory factors: activity, size, competitive
priorities, and information and catalyst elements; sec-
ondly, we shall analyze the differences that can be
seen between integration, perceived difficultie and
plant performance with respect to their investment
patterns.
3.1. Explanatory factors for AMT investment
3.1.1. Activity
The aeronautical engineering industry, like the au-
tomobile or mechanical engineering sectors, has been
characterized in several studies as a relatively intensive
user of advanced manufacturing technologies (Twigg
et al., 1992; Mansfield 1993; Schroder and Sohal,
1999). Although the manufacturing plants and compa-
nies studied fall generically within the same sector, we
believe it is logical that certain relationships should be
evident between the different types of AMT and the
diverse industrial activities undertaken in the sector to
which these technologies are applied.
It is observed that in most cases in the sector
studied, at least one of the activities most related to
fl xible automation is carried out, specificall engi-
neering, machining and/or even assembly. It is worth
remembering that there are other activities that are not
susceptible to automation, such as sheet metal work.
In this context, the firs working hypothesis put for-
ward is the following:
Hypothesis 1. A relationship exists between the in-
dustrial activity of a plant and its pattern of invest-
ments in AMT.
3.1.2. Size
There are numerous studies demonstrating the
existence of a relationship between the size of a com-
pany and its use of technology (Romeo, 1975; Kelley
and Brooks, 1991; Mansfield 1993; Dunne, 1994;
Schroder and Sohal, 1999). Being largely made up
of small-sized ancillary manufacturing units confers
a series of characteristics upon the Andalusian aero-
nautical sector that could affect its capacity to make
investments in AMT and its attitude towards them.
Three of these features are the lack of sufficien finan
cial resources (Machuca et al., 1995), the neglect of
strategic management (Dı´ez de Castro et al., 1995),
and the personal characteristics of the CEO (Santos
Cumplido, 2001).
However, as widely accepted as this relationship
is, it is possible that this does not apply in the An-
dalusian aeronautical sector due to its specifi nature,
and circumstances such as the overriding require-
ment to meet extremely highly specifie standards
of quality and the very close working relationships
with customers/suppliers, who often provide detailed
instructions and supervision for production work.
To this it should be added that several studies con-
ducted in Spain suggest that, although company
size is, in principle, a factor of influence since it
conditions the availability of funds for investment,
it does not seem to constitute a significan barrier
to investment in AMT (Camisón Zornoza, 1994;
Martı´nez Sánchez, 1996). As has been noted previ-
ously, Swamidass and Kotha (1998) obtain similar
results which show that the type of AMT being con-
sidered had an effect on the positive relationship
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between size and use of advanced manufacturing
technology.
For our part, we shall adopt the premise that the size
of the plant is directly related to the use of technology,
and so put forward the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. A relationship exists between the size
of a plant and its pattern of investments in AMT.
3.1.3. Competitive priorities
It is particularly intended that, as part of its third
objective, our study should help supply new data to
augment that provided by recent research (Banerjee,
2000) which points to a company’s strategy having
a possible influenc on its AMT investments due to
the competitive priorities of cost, quality, delivery and
fl xibility.
This relationship, which could not be clearly tested
in the study conducted by Jonsson (2000), is a ques-
tion that has received scant attention to date. On the
one hand, one would think that plants that are more
inclined towards fl xibility might be better disposed
towards investment in fl xible technologies, compared
with other firm which are more inclined towards
cost reduction—although it is also true that AMT
allow both cost reductions and increases in fl xibil-
ity thanks to the economies of scope. On the other
hand, AMT-user companies might be more clearly
inclined towards fl xibility in their procedures as a
consequence of the improved fl xibility that AMT
offer them.
In our study, we shall include these competitive pri-
orities as an explanatory factor of investments made in
AMT, assuming that the relationship analyzed is one
where the strategy gives rise to the investment, but
without excluding the possibility that one of the ef-
fects of a particular pattern of investments might be to
change the direction of a company’s competitive pri-
orities. Our third working hypothesis is therefore the
following:
Hypothesis 3. A relationship exists between the com-
petitive operations priorities of a plant and its pattern
of investments in AMT.
3.1.4. Information elements
A contribution intended from the third objective of
our study is an analysis of any possible relationship
between the level of investment made by plants and
the information elements they have recourse to in or-
der to fully inform themselves about current AMT.
Information on AMT can be gathered from various
sources (Langley and Truax, 1994): suppliers, con-
sultants, government departments and agencies, trades
fairs, journals, workers, and so on. Nevertheless, there
are studies (Sun et al., 1997) that come to the conclu-
sion that when a decision has to be made on a specifi
proposal for AMT investment, not much attention is
paid to some of these sources (books, conferences or
government department-driven initiatives). This could
lead us to believe that the probability of a specifi in-
vestment being made or not will in part depend on the
sources used to gather information. Looking at it from
another angle, it could also be argued that the compa-
nies with the highest levels of investment have made
use of different information sources from those with
lower levels of investment. This leads us to our fourth
working hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4. A relationship exists between the in-
formation elements used by a plant and its pattern of
investments in AMT.
3.1.5. Catalyst elements
Finally, we intend to consider a possible relation-
ship between the level of investment in AMT and
specifi catalyst elements that are present during the
AMT adoption and implementation process. These
catalyst elements are internal or external occurrences
which explicitly trigger the consideration of new
technologies. Amongst these could be a new strate-
gic orientation (due to a change in owner or CEO,
for example), the arrival of a new engineer, plans for
expansion, a rise in profit or an injection of outside
capital (Langley and Truax, 1994). Our fift working
hypothesis is therefore:
Hypothesis 5. A relationship exists between a plant’s
catalyst elements and its pattern of investments in
AMT.
3.2. Effects of investments in AMT
3.2.1. Integration
A priori, new technologies could be adopted either
with a step-by-step approach or by imposing a radical
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change. The latter, however, involves greater risks; fur-
thermore, in any organization there tends to be inertia,
a resistance to changes in the status quo. This makes
it advisable for a company to go along the road to in-
tegrated manufacturing progressively, with measured
steps, making existing procedures for product design
and manufacture their starting point. In fact, there are
authors who believe that a company’s adoption of the
CIM concept should be part of a radical change in
the company’s conception of its business—following
the business process redesign (BPR) approach—and
even these consider that, when it comes to the imple-
mentation of such radical change, this should be done
gradually (Liu and Chen, 1998). Such recommenda-
tions could be due to research finding that suggest
that the more radical the change, the more limited are
the perceptions of those involved of the resulting ben-
efit (Shepherd et al., 2000).
In short, it may safely be concluded that, since a
company must have reached a certain technological
level before it can consider that it should be combined
in an integrated system, a minimum level of existing
use of AMT would appear to be a necessary prerequi-
site for the integration of activities (Boyer et al., 1996;
Nagalingam and Lin, 1999). Furthermore, one of the
results that can be expected of higher levels of invest-
ment in AMT is a greater degree of integration be-
tween activities. From these expectations emerges our
sixth working hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6. A relationship exists between a
company’s pattern of AMT investments and the de-
gree of integration of its production activities.
3.2.2. Performance
When it comes to describing the many actual and
potential benefit and advantages that AMT offers,
the literature can be grouped into different cate-
gories. Thus, for example, McDermott and Stock
(1999) distinguish between operational benefit (that
bring improvements in productivity and fl xibility),
organizational benefit (that include improvements
in work-fl w, communication, integration and man-
agement control), and competitive benefit (where
improvements in sales growth, market share or the
return on investment could be sought). Nevertheless,
the criterion usually adopted seems to involve dif-
ferentiation between those benefit that would fall
within the framework of company strategies and those
that have come to be designated as operational, even
though the latter will surely be reflecte in the for-
mer and therefore in the overall performance of the
manufacturing plant.
Research conducted to date on patterns of invest-
ment and company performance shows results that, a
priori at least, seem to point in opposite directions.
Boyer et al. (1996) observed that there were no dif-
ferences in performance on the basis of the each
company’s investment pattern, which is in line with
results obtained by other authors that indicate that
the use of AMT does not have any direct impact on
a company’s performance (Swamidass and Kotha,
1998). Jonsson (2000), for his part, did note differ-
ences in performance between the different groups,
with the high investors being those who displayed
greater performance. This is in line with results ob-
tained by other authors who noted a higher perfor-
mance from those companies with greater investment
in advanced manufacturing technologies (Gordon and
Sohal, 2001). In the light of such diverse premises and
results, we put our fina hypothesis in the following
limited terms:
Hypothesis 7. A relationship exists between a plant’s
pattern of investments in AMT and its performance.
3.2.3. Difficultie
The various problems associated with the imple-
mentation of advanced manufacturing technologies
(Babbar and Rai, 1990; Boer et al., 1990; Gerwin
and Kolodny, 1992; Aggarwal, 1995; Sohal, 1997)
have thus far been classifie into two inter-related
types (Naik and Chakravarty, 1992; Kaighobadi and
Venkatesh, 1994): technical problems and manage-
ment problems. This distinction could easily be ex-
tended to the different types of AMT, as long as it is
borne in mind that the more complex the technolo-
gies installed, the greater the problems that might
occur. As far as technical problems are concerned,
it is thought that these are due to the complexity of
the technology per se, and the technical and analyt-
ical decisions that have to be taken when advanced
manufacturing systems are introduced. The main
management problems that are highlighted given the
complexity of implementation are the management’s
resistance to change and the complex infrastructure
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the systems require. Fortunately, not all the possible
costs and inconveniences that the implementation of
AMT could, a priori, involve have to be faced when
making investments. This will logically depend on
each specifi case and the circumstances of the com-
pany in question. Sun et al. (1997) point out that the
reason for this could be attributed to the previous
experience a company has had in this type of invest-
ment, and this stands out as one of the crucial factors
for success. Assuming that the differences we expect
to detect between the groups in the population under
analysis will depend on their level of investment in
AMT, and that this will be reflecte in the level of
complexity of the equipment and the specifi experi-
ence had by each factory, our last working hypothesis
is as follows:
Hypothesis 8. A relationship exists between the dif-
ficultie observed by a plant and its pattern of invest-
ments in AMT.
4. Methodology
4.1. Sample and data gathering
As already indicated, the target population is made
up of manufacturing plants operating in the Andalu-
sian aeronautical sector. In total, there are 3 plants
belonging to the CASA group, and 17 small- and
medium-sized ancillary companies. In view of this low
number, we decided to conduct a comprehensive anal-
ysis of the sector and study the entire population.
With regard to data gathering, it must be taken into
account that this specifi study is encompassed within
a wider research project on the adoption and imple-
mentation of AMT in the Andalusian aeronautical
sector. Given that the relatively wide scope of such
a project would require the use of quite long ques-
tionnaires, it was decided to break the study into two
parts in order to avoid the likely initial respondent
resistance to a single, excessively-long questionnaire.
The basic objective of the firs part of the question-
naire was to determine the types and extent of AMT
use in the sector, and a postal survey was used for this
purpose. Our starting point for its design was a pre-
liminary draft made after a detailed study of similar
questionnaires used in empirical studies of this type
(Miller and Roth, 1994; Mechling et al., 1995; Small
and Chen, 1995; Boyer et al., 1996; Milling, 1997).
This preliminary version was submitted to successive
tests by researchers not involved in the study, with a
view to improving the questions and their wording. A
pilot survey involving three companies from the pop-
ulation was then conducted to test the resulting ques-
tionnaire. The definit ve questionnaire was mailed to
all plants in the population on 23 July 1999. The col-
lation of responses was completed on 10 March 2000;
this prolonged delay would have been even greater if
not for the perseverance shown in follow-up telephone
work. This not inconsiderable effort enabled both a
100% response rate to eventually be achieved, and
also doubts that had arisen in some plants about some
of the questions to be clarified thus contributing to
an increase in the reliability of the data obtained.
Armed with knowledge of the AMT to be found in
each plant, a second questionnaire was devised fol-
lowing a process similar to that used for the first The
aim was to obtain data on the investment adoption and
implementation process, and to determine, in relative
terms, the performance of the plants analyzed in the
population. It was decided to conduct personal inter-
views for the completion of the questionnaire in order
to avoid another long wait for the survey responses to
be collated and further possible problems of interpre-
tation, both of which were real possibilities given the
relative complexity of the second questionnaire. This
decision was facilitated by the relatively small number
of interviews that would be required (20). The second
questionnaire was mailed on 24 January 2001 so that
respondents could familiarize themselves with its con-
tent well before the interview. On this occasion, the
process of data gathering took less than 3 months.
The average duration of the interviews was 2 h,
somewhat longer than was initially estimated. This
was due to various other matters not specifie in the
questionnaire being dealt with during the course of
the interview. The related matters that arose out of the
conversations were useful insofar as they allowed us
to gain a deeper insight into unforeseen aspects of the
topic. As for questions included in the second ques-
tionnaire directly related to this paper, two examples
would be the main objectives or benefit expected and
which had motivated the investments, and the extent
to which some factors had hampered the AMT adop-
tion and implementation process (a lack of skilled
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workers, the reorganization of the workplace, and so
on).
In most of the smaller auxiliary companies, it was
the managing director and owner who completed both
questionnaires, an advantage that cannot usually be
guaranteed in this type of study when mail is the only
means of contact. As for the larger plants, it was the
head or assistant head of engineering who fille out
the firs questionnaire and attended the interviews.
Another point to be emphasized is that the informa-
tion obtained from the firs questionnaire was reviewed
at the start of each interview with two aims: firstl ,
to determine how the investments being evaluated had
developed since the plants had responded to the firs
questionnaire; and secondly, to detect any possible er-
rors and omissions in the responses. As a consequence,
some had to be corrected. This fact is indicative of the
risks associated with studies based on postal question-
Table 4
Information and catalyst elements: indicators and scales of measurement
Measurement scale
How great an importance do you think the following factors have had in determining
your investments in AMT?
No importance Medium importance Maximum importance
Information elements
Information from suppliers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Information from workers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Other companies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Trades Fairs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Journals and Magazines 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Government Departments and Agencies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Catalyst elements
Arrival of new employee/executive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Plans for Expansion 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Rising profit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Injection of outside capital 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Existence of skilled labor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
To what degree do you think the following factors have had an adverse effect
on the adoption and implementation process of your investments in AMT?
No difficult Medium difficult High difficult
Difficultie
Lack of skilled labor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Loss of fl xibility 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Equipment breaking down 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Re-organization of Depts. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Reticence amongst employees 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Reticence amongst executives 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Difficultie with evaluation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Difficultie with performance measurement 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Difficultie with financin 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
naires: the accuracy and reliability of the data gathered
is extremely dependent on the attention given by the
respondents and on their correct interpretation or un-
derstanding of the questions posed. As this experience
demonstrates, this is often not the case.
4.2. Measurement scales
Activity, plant size, information and catalyst ele-
ments, and difficultie observed during the adoption
and implementation process were measured on unidi-
mensional scales. Given that one of the possible effects
of investing in AMT that can be predicted might be a
variation in the size of the work-force, we preferred to
estimate the company size variable on the basis of an-
nual sales volumes. Each information or catalyst ele-
ment and each difficult was independently measured
on a Likert scale of seven points (see Table 4).
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The rest of the factors considered were measured on
multidimensional scales. For the development and val-
idation of scales, various recommendations provided
in literature in recent years were taken into account,
such as the utilization of sub-constructs or the utiliza-
tion of scales previously validated in other research
(Malhotra and Grover, 1998; O’Leary-Kelly and
Vokurka, 1998; Hensley, 1999). This latter factor was
responsible for the decision to opt in almost all cases
for a Likert seven-point measurement scale, since this
is the scale that is habitually applied in OM research
surveys. However, in the operations field only a small
number of other scales have so far been developed. The
scales utilized in our research were adopted from other
studies, with slight adaptations in some cases. This led
us to expect, a priori, high levels of inter-item reliabil-
ity; on the other hand, all the scales can be assumed
to be new if we consider that they have never before
been applied exclusively to companies in the aeronau-
tical sector, and this could imply less reliability than
expected. As described later, after the correspond-
ing reliability test it was necessary to modify one of
the scales.
To measure the inter-item reliability of the scales
we employed Cronbach’s α, which is clearly the most
extensively used. As is known, this coefficien can take
values between 0 and 1, and the higher the coefficient
the higher the reliability. No general agreement seems
to exist with regard to the value the coefficien should
have for it to be considered acceptable (O’Leary-Kelly
and Vokurka, 1998, p. 397); proposals have been found
ranging from 0.4 (Van de Ven and Ferry, 1980) to 0.7
(Nunnally, 1978). However, a different level is usually
required depending on whether the scale to be assessed
is already well established (0.7) or has been newly
developed (0.6) (Nunnally, 1978; Flynn et al., 1990;
Hair et al., 1999).
As regards the validity of the scales utilized, that
is, whether the scales effectively measure the concepts
that they are intended to measure and no others, this
was gauged by means of content validity. As it is im-
possible to evaluate this aspect with statistical tools
(Hoskisson et al., 1993, p. 217), expert judgement or
references in literature have to be relied upon to de-
termine whether the scale in question truly measures
the concept or construct for which it was developed.
This measurement is therefore by nature subjective
and, as such, will always be debatable. As recom-
mended by various authors, in our research, content
validity was checked by employing previously devel-
oped scales (Flynn et al., 1990; Malhotra and Grover,
1998; Hensley, 1999) that in some cases were adapted
on the basis of a rigorous bibliographical review and
the opinion of more than a dozen researchers and uni-
versity teachers.
Although a high level of reliability is a necessary
but not sufficien condition to ensure the validity of a
research survey, we consider that by employing scales
previously validated in other studies and by obtaining
very high indicators of their reliability in our popula-
tion, they are sufficien to ensure an acceptable level
of validity.
4.2.1. Investment in AMT
Since the development of a taxonomy is not in-
tended to defin ideal types, but rather to classify the
organizations studied into comprehensive and mutu-
ally exclusive groups, the choice of the variables used
to establish the classificatio is a decision of cru-
cial importance that should be made on the basis of
existing theory and the nature of the research study
to be conducted (Ketchen and Shook, 1996; Miller,
1996). Many classification can be found in literature
on AMT, although they all reflec a high degree of
similarity. The criterion most widely applied for the
categorization of AMT is based on the function or
type of activity that the technology performs. Three
basic categories of advanced automation can be dis-
tinguished: that used in design/engineering, that used
in manufacturing and that used for the administrative
tasks of planning and control. The origin of this clas-
sificatio can be found in Meredith (1987), with sub-
sequent modification along similar lines by other au-
thors. Boyer et al. (1996) compiled a list of the various
classification that have appeared in literature which
we have taken as the basis for Table 5, where the
various types of technology are arranged in columns
and authors in rows. As can be observed, AGV and
AS/RS do not explicitly appear in Table 5. The rea-
son for this is that both technologies are included in
the more generic term of AMHS, since some of the
studies included in this table do not make a distinc-
tion between the two. Nevertheless, in the studies by
Lei and Goldhar (1991), Gerwin and Kolodny (1992),
Machuca et al. (1995), and Cohen and Apte (1997),
the two technologies are referred to separately, in the
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Table 5
A number of existing classification for AMT
Design Manufacturing Planning
CAD CAE CAPP GT CAM NC CNC RP AMHS FMS CAI MRP MRPII JIT CPM ABC SFC
Rosenthal (1984)
CAD ∗
CAD/CAM ∗
CAM ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Factory management and control ∗ ∗
Meredith (1987)
Engineering techniques ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Manufacturing techniques ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Business techniques ∗
Adler (1988)
Design automation ∗ ∗
Manufacturing automation ∗ ∗ ∗
Administrative automation ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Lei and Goldhar (1991)
CAD ∗ ∗ ∗
CAM ∗ ∗ ∗
Planning ∗ ∗ ∗
Saraph and Sebastian (1992)
Process technologies ∗ ∗ ∗
Planning systems ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Gerwin and Kolodny (1992)
Product and process design ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Manufacturing planning and control ∗ ∗
CAM ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Machuca et al. (1995)
Shop-floo automation ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Engineering automation ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Planning and control automation ∗ ∗ ∗
Cohen and Apte (1997)
Design ∗ ∗ ∗
Programmable automation
technologies for fabrication
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Infrastructure technologies ∗
Planning and programming ∗ ∗
Swamidass and Kotha (1998)
Product design technologies ∗ ∗
Process technologies ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Logistics/planning technologies ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
From Boyer et al. (1996, p. 300), modifie and extended.
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sameway they have been analyzed in the present study.
This means that a distinction has been made between
AGV and AS/RS in the analysis, even though they
appear as one in Table 5 under the acronym of AMHS,
as separate information is not available for each in all
the sources used.
None of the classification consulted have been
exclusively adhered to for determining the types of
technology in the firs column of the table; rather,
an ad hoc compilation and synthesis has been made
(Adler, 1988; Starr, 1989; Fine, 1990; Aquilano and
Chase, 1991; Gerwin and Kolodny, 1992; Álvarez Gil,
1993; Vanderspek, 1993; Machuca et al., 1995; Small
and Chen, 1995; Boyer et al., 1996; Krajewski and
Ritzman, 1996; Cohen and Apte, 1997; Swamidass
and Kotha, 1998). In this way, we have tried to produce
the most complete and descriptive taxonomy possible,
one which would serve as a basis for the measurement
scale for investments in AMT and for the construction
of our firs questionnaire. Other technologies such as
e-mail or EDI that are taken into account by other au-
thors (Boyer et al., 1996) have not been included, as
these were not strictly considered to be manufacturing
technologies. MRP was also excluded after data anal-
ysis confirme that it has been completely replaced
by MRPII in the Andalusian aeronautical sector.
With regard to the method used for measuring these
investments, what is usually done in similar studies is
that the persons surveyed respond on a Likert scale
of seven points depending on the level or intensity of
the investments made by their company in each tech-
nology (there are, however, studies which measure in-
vestment much more simply, for example, in Small
and Yasin (1997)). There are several reasons why we
decided against such an option in this case. The re-
sponses thus obtained suffer from a markedly subjec-
tive character, although this disadvantage seems to be
taken as the lesser of two evils in existing empirical
studies on the topic. In our opinion, this disadvantage
could be exacerbated in a study such as ours, where the
population is so small and includes a high proportion
of smaller companies that, a priori, were not expected
to be over-familiar with these types of technology, and
where there could also be great disagreement between
one company and another on what might be consid-
ered a ‘large’ or ‘small’ investment. Moreover, in the
overall framework of objectives for the research pro-
gram within which the present study is encompassed,
and in the specifi case of manufacturing AMTs, it
was not sufficien to clarify whether the plants consid-
ered their investments to be small, medium or large;
we needed to know the number of machines and sys-
tems installed in each case. Consequently, a dichoto-
mous variable was utilized for each technology that
expressed either the existence (1) or absence (0) of
each type of technology in a plant.
In the specifi case of manufacturing AMTs, the
plants not only indicated the presence of the technol-
ogy in question, but also the number of items of equip-
ment installed in the plant. We thought this fact should
be included in the measurement as the intensity of in-
vestments would obviously differ greatly depending
on the number of items of equipment installed com-
pared with the rest of the plants. This was added to
the scale by incorporating the quotient of the number
of items installed in the plant and the total number of
items of equipment installed in the entire sector to the
1 that represented the existence of the technology (if
this was the case). To give an example: if a plant in
the population were to have amongst its manufactur-
ing equipment 2 CAM systems, 7 CNC systems and
3 CAI systems, whilst the total number of items of
equipment of these three types of AMT for the en-
tire population were 90, 103 and 16, respectively, the
score awarded to the factory in question would be:
AMTF = (1+ 2/90)+ (1+ 7/103)+ (1+ 3/16) =
1.02+ 1.07+ 1.19 = 3.28.
Each company is given a total score for each type
of AMT (design, manufacture and planning). In the
remainder of the paper, these three variables will be
referred to as AMTD, AMTF and AMTP. It is impor-
tant to highlight that one of the consequences of this is
that graduation of the measurement scales varies de-
pending on the type of AMT. This has to be taken into
account both when comparing mean values and, when
conducting the cluster analysis. After measuring the
reliability of the scales, none of the items had to be
eliminated since, as can be seen in Table 6, Cronbach’s
α is above the reference value of 0.7 in all three cases.
4.2.2. Competitive priorities
The indicators adopted in the case of competitive
priorities are shown in Table 7. Almost all of these
had been identifie in previous studies (Corbett, 1996;
Roth, 1996; Boyer and McDermott, 1999; Avella
Camarero and Fernández Sánchez, 2000; Boyer and
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Table 6
AMT investments: scales and reliability coefficient
Technology Mean S.D.
Design (AMTD) (α = 0.7135) Computer-aided design (CAD) 0.70 0.47
Computer-aided engineering (CAE) 0.45 0.51
Computer-aided process planning (CAPP) 0.30 0.47
Group technology (GT) 0.30 0.47
Scale 1.75 1.41
Manufacturing (AMTF) (α = 0.8098) Computer-aided manufacturing (CAM) 0.65 0.56
Numerical control (NC) 0.10 0.45
Computer numerical control (CNC) 0.60 0.56
Robotics (PR) 0.00 0.00
Automated guided vehicles (AGV) 0.15 0.46
Automated storage/retrieval systems (AS/RS) 0.10 0.45
Flexible manufacturing systems (FMS) 0.10 0.45
Computer-aided inspection (CAI) 0.45 0.57
Scale 2.15 2.46
Planning (AMTP) (α = 0.8105) Manufacturing resource planning (MRPII) 0.35 0.49
Just in time (JIT) 0.00 0.00
Computerized preventive maintenance (CPM) 0.15 0.37
Activity-based costing (ABC) 0.15 0.37
Shop-floo control (SFC) 0.20 0.41
Scale 0.85 1.39
Pagell, 2000; Ward and Duray, 2000). The only ex-
ception is the item “to establish a culture of quality”,
the inclusion of which has been considered appro-
priate given the importance that is attached to this
objective in the sector under study. The importance
given to each of the objectives has been measured
Table 7
Operations competitive priorities: scales and reliability coefficient
Objective Mean S.D.
Cost (α = 0.7353) Reduce inventory 2.90 1.94
Reduce production costs 5.80 0.89
Increase labor productivity 5.55 1.05
Scale 4.75 0.25
Quality (α = 0.6929) Consistent quality with low defect rate 6.35 0.49
Supply of reliable products 6.30 0.98
Establish a culture of quality 6.55 0.60
Scale 6.40 0.57
Delivery Meet promised delivery dates 6.50 0.69
Flexibility (α = 0.6799) Fast introduction of new products 5.30 1.49
Adjust capacity quickly 4.95 1.39
Fast changes in volume 4.95 1.23
Offer a wide range of products 4.20 2.33
Fast changes in product mix 3.40 2.11
Scale 4.59 1.19
on a Likert scale of seven points (1 = not important;
4 = important; 7 = critically important).
On calculating Cronbach’s α for the scale that was
initially proposed, we discovered that in this case
the values obtained would not guarantee an accept-
able level of reliability. The values of the indicator
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Table 8
Integration: scale and reliability coefficien
Connections Mean S.D.
Integration (α = 0.8994) Between product design and process planning 3.05 2.70
Between product design and manufacturing 3.90 2.92
Between product design and production planning 2.40 2.41
Between process planning and manufacturing 3.10 2.79
Between production planning and manufacturing 2.50 2.46
Between various items of manufacturing equipment 2.15 1.87
Scale 2.85 2.08
of inter-item reliability that are shown in Table 7 are
those obtained after eliminating items that prevented
an adequate level of reliability being achieved.
Regarding the reliability of the deliveries sub-
construct, the value obtained for Cronbach’s α on
the scale proposed, which included a second item
(fast deliveries), was very low (0.1236). A qualitative
analysis of the responses obtained in the interviews
showed that while the objective of deliveries was
important for some of the companies in the sector,
it was not a priority objective for competitiveness
for any of the companies. In addition, in a sector in
which manufacture requires considerable periods of
time, and where most of the work is under contract,
a reduction in manufacture times in order to achieve
faster deliveries seems to be much less important than
complying with promised delivery dates; this is what
seems to be suggested by the mean and standard de-
viation obtained for the two items (the objective fast
deliveries obtained a lower mean (5.19) and a higher
standard deviation (1.39) than the objective deliveries
on time (6.5 and 0.69, respectively)). For this reason,
it was decided to measure the deliveries objective on
a mono-dimensional scale that exclusively analyzes
the importance of meeting promised delivery dates.
4.2.3. Integration
The degree of integration has been measured by the
extent to which partial transactions between activities
are computerized. All possible partial integration taken
into consideration is shown in Table 8 and has been
measured on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = not in-
tegrated (0%); 4 = semi-integrated (50%); 7 = fully
integrated (100%)). The source of this scale is Dean
et al. (1992), and it has been utilized in subsequent
studies in the same way as it is here (Boyer et al.,
1996; Milling, 1997; Jonsson, 2000).
4.2.4. Performance
We have approached the measurement of perfor-
mance through four indicators, two related to growth
(market share and sales) and two to profit (ROI and
ROS); the validity of these indicators is supported by
previous empirical studies (Boyer et al., 1996, 1997;
Gupta et al., 1997; Ward and Duray, 2000). For each
indicator, the measurement considered the position of
the company in relation to its competitors over the past
3 years on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = significantl
worse; 4 = similar; 7 = significantl better). None of
the items had to be eliminated from the scale, as the
value of Cronbach’s α was notably higher than 0.7 in
both cases (see Table 9).
4.3. Data analysis
A cluster analysis was conducted usingWard’s hier-
archical method of minimum variance (Everitt, 1981),
based on the values of the AMTD, AMTF and AMTP
variables. The objective was to test our proposition as
to whether the plants in the Andalusian aeronautical
sector can be classifie into distinct groups according
to their relative commitment to each type of AMT, that
is, whether an AMT investment patterns taxonomy can
Table 9
Performance: scales and reliability coefficient
Objectives Mean S.D.
Growth (α = 0.8645) Market share growth 5.15 1.31
Sales growth 5.45 1.19
Scale 5.30 1.17
Profi (α = 0.9596) Return on investment
(ROI)
4.95 1.08
Return on sales (ROS) 4.74 1.04
Scale 4.84 1.04
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be established. These values have been typifie in or-
der to minimize any influenc that the different scales
used for each variable might have.
To test Hypothesis 1, which deals with the re-
lationship between company activity—a qualitative
variable—and patterns of investment, we have made
use of Fisher’s exact test (Ruiz-Maya, 1995). The
rest of the proposed hypotheses have been tested by
one-way ANOVAs and the corresponding multiple
comparison least significan difference (LSD) test3
that allows any possible differences detected to be
observed by pairs of treatments.
We feel it is important to point out that all these
statistical tests take into account the size of the sample
being analyzed when determining the significanc of
the contrast, which means they are no less valid for
having been calculated on the basis of a relatively
small number of elements. In the specifi case of the
cluster analysis, it must not be forgotten that this is an
objective method that quantifie the structural features
of a whole range of observations, and not a statistical
inference technique that analyzes the extent to which
the parameters of a sample could be representative
of a population (Hair et al., 1999). The SPSS 10.0
statistical program was used for data analysis.
5. Results and discussion
5.1. Investment patterns identifie in the sector
As previously stated, a cluster analysis was per-
formed. One of the key aspects of cluster analyzes is
to determine the appropriate number of groups; the
aim is to balance parsimony (the fewer the groups
the better for comparisons and for drawing definit
conclusions) and accuracy (which should increase in
accordance with the number of groups). Other studies
employing this type of analysis, such as the previ-
ously referred to work by Boyer et al. (1996), make
use of certain ground rules, such as those proposed
by Lehmann (1979) and Milligan and Cooper (1985),
to decide upon an appropriate number of clusters
3 This is simply a t-test on various pairs of treatments. Instead
of calculating s2 for each pair of treatments, the error mean square
from the ANOVA table is used as an overall mean value (SPSS
algorithms).
depending on the number of elements in the sample.
In our case, given the relatively few companies sur-
veyed, such rules are clearly inapplicable. This does
not represent a serious disadvantage insofar as the
basic criterion for the grouping is that the result ob-
tained may be interpreted in the light of the problem
posed. In fact, existing theories (Woodward, 1965;
Wheelwright and Hayes, 1985) establish that a good
taxonomy should be relatively unaffected by the tech-
nique or the sample used to construct it; it may even
be based on mere observation, as its powers of de-
scription can still be very considerable (Miller, 1996).
With this in mind, the cluster analysis enables three
groups of plants to be clearly differentiated on the ba-
sis of their investments in AMT, as can be seen in the
dendrogram in Fig. 2. In short, it can be stated that
cluster membership is assessed by calculating the total
sum of squared deviations from the mean of a cluster.
The criterion for fusion is that it should produce the
smallest possible increase in the error sum of squares.
Ward’s minimum variance method has been applied to
the typifie values obtained for each variable in order
to prevent the differences in the scales used to mea-
sure AMTD, AMTF and AMTP distorting the relative
distances between the means.
Having identifie these three groups, a one-way
ANOVA was carried out to check that the differences
between them were significant the results of these
tests and the means for the three variables (AMTD,
AMTF and AMTP) in each group, are presented in
Table 10. For a more detailed analysis of the dif-
ferences found between the means for pairs of clus-
ters, a multiple comparison LSD test was performed.
The results of this test have also been incorporated in
Table 10. For each group, the other group or groups
for which the differences presented are significan for
P < 0.05, are indicated in brackets.
From the results obtained it is possible to distinguish
three clusters, each of which contains a set of plants
which we have designated traditionalists (cluster 1),
designers (cluster 2) and investors (cluster 3) on the
basis of their investments in each type of AMT and
their differences from the plants included in the other
two groups:
(1) Traditionalists: This cluster groups a total of nine
plants (45% of the population) that base their man-
ufacturing activities on traditional technologies.
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Fig. 2. Ward’s minimum variance cluster method: dendrogram.
Table 10
AMT investments by group: results of ANOVA and LSD test
Traditionalists
(cluster 1, n = 9)
Designers
(cluster 2, n = 8)
Investors
(cluster 3, n = 3)
ANOVA
AMTD [2, 3] [1] [1]
Mean 0.44 2.62 3.33 F = 28.113
S.D. 0.53 0.92 0.58 P < 0.001
AMTF [3] [3] [1, 2]
Mean 0.81 2.15 6.18 F = 11.065
S.D. 0.14 1.16 3.87 P < 0.001
AMTP [3] [3] [1, 2]
Mean 0.44 0.25 3.66 F = 28.534
S.D. 0.88 0.46 0.58 P < 0.001
Numbers in brackets indicate other groups significantl different from the cluster in the multiple comparison LSD test (P < 0.05). The
differences in the scales used to measure the AMTD, AMTF and AMTP variables must be taken into account to correctly interpret and
compare the means (see Section 4.2).
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Their investments in any of the three types of
AMT stand at a very low level and in every case
fall below the mean for the sector. Although in
the case of planning AMTs the mean of their
investments (0.44) is somewhat higher than in
the designers (0.25) group, this difference is not
significant
(2) Designers: This cluster comprises eight compa-
nies (40% of the population) with high invest-
ments in design AMTs. Although their mean level
of AMTD (2.62) is lower than that of the investor
plants (3.33), this difference is not significant
However, their investments in both manufacture
and planning AMTs are at a similar low level to
that of the traditionalists, to the extent that sig-
nifican differences in these variables cannot be
appreciated between them. Although their AMTF
mean (2.15) is higher than that of the tradition-
alists (0.81), the wide standard deviations of the
two groups detract from the significanc of the
differences. It may be concluded therefore that
this group identifie those plants inclined towards
design AMTs.
(3) Investors: This is the smallest group identified
with only three plants (15% of the population),
those which correspond to CASA. These have
the greatest mean investments in all three types
of AMT, clearly surpassing the mean for the
sector as a whole, although, as previously in-
dicated, the difference from the designers in
the level of AMTD does not reach a significan
level.
Given the differences in the measurement scales
utilized and in the variables taken into account to
construct the different taxonomies, we tentatively be-
lieve that certain similarities can be observed between
the different groups in the Andalusian aeronautical
sector and those found in the previous studies on our
approach to the analysis of the question in hand was
based. The firs similarity can be found in the tradi-
tionalist group. In all respects, this seems to be identi-
fiabl with similarly-designated groups in Boyer et al.
(1996) and Jonsson (2000). With regard to this latter
study, although our grouping does not take account
the integration variable, it should be noted that the
traditionalist group is characterized by a low level of
investment in all three types of AMT. The result is that
the degree of integration is, as we shall see later, also
very low (a characteristic feature of the traditionalist
group according to the Jonsson (2000) taxonomy).
The second close comparison can be seen in the in-
vestor group, but in this case the similarities cannot
be so clearly established. There is absolutely no doubt
that this is the group that has invested most in the three
different types of AMT, and as such it can be identi-
fie with the group of large investors in the taxonomy
of Boyer et al. (1996). Nevertheless, the relatively few
plants included in our population, and the even smaller
number that have what might be termed a generalized
use of AMT, taken together with the differences in the
scales utilized, means that the possibility cannot be
discounted that our group of investor companies might
actually correspond more to the group designated as
generalist companies by the above-mentioned authors.
Furthermore, although the AMTF mean for our in-
vestors group is very high (6.18), typical deviation is
also rather high (3.87), as a result of which relative
dispersion measured by the variation coefficien (stan-
dard deviation/mean) is 62.6%. Although this value
is not excessively high, it is nonetheless indicative of
the fact that clear differences do exist from one plant
to another in this cluster with respect to investments
in AMTF. In other words, although we have detected
this pattern in the Andalusian aeronautical sector, the
differentiation by degrees found in Boyer et al. (1996)
is not possible. At the same time, our investors group
is equally identifiabl with the similarly named group
in the Jonsson (2000) taxonomy. If we again apply the
previously-stated argument regarding the relationship
between level of investments and integration, which
will be tested later, in this group, where investments
reach the highest level for all three types of AMT, the
degree of integration should also be high, this being a
characteristic feature of the group of high investors of
the Jonsson (2000) taxonomy.
Lastly, a clear similarity can be appreciated between
our designer group and the similarly-named group in
the Boyer et al. (1996) taxonomy, since their invest-
ments made in design AMTs are relatively high, while
those made in manufacture and planning AMTs are not
so high; in both cases, these latter types of investment
are similar to those made by the traditionalist com-
panies. Disregarding the integration variable, there do
not seem to be any possible grounds for the identifi
cation of our designer group with the hard integrators
18
in Jonsson’s taxonomy. The companies that Jonsson
(2000) identifie as hard integrators are not only char-
acterized by this main feature of integration, but also
by the fact that they made their largest AMT invest-
ments in planning. This characterization cannot be ap-
plied in any sense to the designer companies that have
been identifie in the Andalusian aeronautical sector.
The unquestionable identificatio of a group of de-
signer companies in principle supports the hypothesis
put forward by Boyer (1999) to the effect that the de-
signer and the generalist companies follow different
development patterns. A longitudinal study would be
necessary to allow an assessment to be made of the
way the companies in the sector evolve over a period
of time.
5.2. Explanatory factors for AMT investment
patterns in the sector
5.2.1. Activity and patterns of investment
The Fisher exact statistic was calculated with the
aim of either accepting or rejecting possible depen-
dency relationships between each pair of activities and
clusters, obtaining the results shown in Table 11. As
can be seen, although the null hypothesis of indepen-
dence could be accepted for the majority of pairs,
Table 11
Correlation between activity and groups
Activity Traditionalists Designers Investors
Sheet metal work (n = 3)
FES 0.566 0.242 0.404
CC 0.180 0.324 0.211
Machining (n = 7)
FES 0.005 0.004 1.000
CC 0.553 0.565 0.015
Engineering (n = 13)
FES 0.160 0.642 0.521
CC 0.363 0.169 0.295
Design (n = 9)
FES 0.010 0.065 0.566
CC 0.525 0.442 0.180
Assembly (n = 12)
FES 0.670 0.167 0.242
CC 0.122 0.351 0.324
FES: Fisher’s exact statistic (bilateral exact significance) CC:
contingency coefficient
there are some clearly identifie dependency relation-
ships in which the exact bilateral significance shown
in bold, is less than 0.05.
The firs dependency relationships of note are those
between machining as a main activity and the tradi-
tionalist and designer groups, although in opposite
ways. A relationship does exist between a company
that does machining activity and its belonging to
the designer group but, at the same time, there is a
different relationship that shows that a company be-
longing to the traditionalist group does not usually
do machining. It is perhaps surprising that machining
work should be one of the characteristics of designer
plants; but such a relationship appears logical if one
considers that these companies either have to design
their own parts or tooling, or else have to use design
AMTs in order to be able to read the designs of their
customers. Lastly, it should be noted that when a plant
belongs to the traditionalist group, this is significantl
related to its not undertaking design activities.
Putting aside statistically significan relationships,
we believe that it is interesting to observe what the
primary activities of the companies in each group are.
This data is provided in Table 12.
If we take into account the results obtained fromHy-
pothesis 1—as previously tested—and the data shown
in Table 11, we have to accept that a relationship
does exist between the industrial activity of a plant
and its AMT investment pattern. Firstly, it can be
clearly concluded that, in the population analyzed,
most designer companies undertake machining work
(although they may also undertake assembly work).
Table 12
Main activity by group
Group Plants by activity
Traditionalists (n = 9) 3 Assembly
2 Assembly and sheet metal work
1 Assembly and composite materials
1 Engineering
1 Thermal treatment
1 Pipework and fina processes
Designers (n = 8) 3 Machining
3 Machining and assembly
2 Engineering and design
Investors (n = 3) 1 Assembly
1 Assembly and machining
1 Assembly and sheet metal work
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Table 13
Size by group: results of ANOVA and LSD test
Traditionalists
(cluster 1, n = 9)
Designers
(cluster 2, n = 8)
Investors
(cluster 3, n = 3)
ANOVA
Annual sales [3] [3] [1, 2]
Mean 641.666 660.500 15190.333 F = 29.951
S.D. 749.374 492.767 8567.303 P < 0.001
Numbers in brackets indicate other groups significantl different from the cluster in the multiple comparison LSD test (P < 0.05).
Secondly, although most of the plants in the tradition-
alist group can be seen to conduct a wide variety of
activities, they are mainly engaged in assembly and
not machining. Finally, in the investor group, where
the plants are primarily concerned with assembly—an
activity that can be automated, although this is not es-
pecially easy—the fundamental influenc of the size
of the company is discernible. Section 5.2.2 deals with
the relationship between the size of a plant and the
cluster into which it falls.
5.2.2. Size and patterns of investment
To test the second hypothesis, a one-way ANOVA
was performed together with the corresponding mul-
tiple comparison LSD test that allows the differences
detected to be observed by pairs of clusters. The re-
sults are given in Table 13, where it can be appreci-
ated how, as anticipated, differences do exist between
the size of the plants in accordance with the cluster to
which they belong.
The size of the companies in the investor group is
significantl different from that of the companies in
the other two groups, with the level of significanc
being 0.01 in both cases. Consequently, it has to be
accepted that there is a relationship between the size
of a plant and its pattern of investment in AMT. How-
ever, no significan differences in size are seen be-
tween designer and traditionalist plants. Furthermore,
in light of the means obtained for each, and of the
level of significanc in the LSD test (0.990), it can be
assumed that there is practically no difference in size
between these last two groups. This is understandable
if it is taken into account that, firstl , the cost of design
AMTs is relatively low and their usefulness is rela-
tively high as a piece of stand-alone equipment: they
do not need to be closely integrated with other systems
to be productive. This argument has been used in other
empirical studies (Twigg et al., 1992; McDermott
and Marucheck, 1995). Secondly, we have seen that in
the traditionalist and designer groups the investments
are very closely linked to the type of activity under-
taken, a factor that has been confirme independently
of company size.
What has been discussed so far suggests the exis-
tence of a certain size threshold above which invest-
ments in AMT are considerably higher, independently
of the activity undertaken. Below this size threshold,
investments basically seem to be related to type of ac-
tivity, and differences between the similarly-sized tra-
ditionalist and designer companies can only be found
in design AMT and, to a lesser extent, in manufactur-
ing AMT (although in this latter case, not to a signif-
icant level). In the following sections, a closer look
will be taken at the question of whether there are dif-
ferent patterns of investment, and at the way they are
interpreted, apart from the differences that exist be-
tween large and small plants, and between plants that
do machining work and those that do not.
5.2.3. Competitive priorities and patterns of
investment
With regard to the third hypothesis, as has already
been argued, the competitive priorities of the different
groups in the taxonomy obtained should also be ex-
pected to vary, suggesting that the way a company’s
strategy is directed also influence the type of invest-
ments it makes. When an ANOVAwas performed, this
showed that the only significan difference between
groups is with respect to the priority given to fl xibil-
ity, there being no differences in the rest of the prior-
ities analyzed. The results detailing these differences
are given in Table 14, together with the results of the
LSD test (shown in brackets). These differences are
only significan between the cluster of designers, on
the one hand, and the clusters of traditionalists and in-
vestors, on the other, with the firs group being the one
that attaches the greatest importance to fl xibility. It
should firs be highlighted that the strategic orientation
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Table 14
Competitive priorities by group: results of ANOVA and LSD test
Traditionalists
(cluster 1, n = 9)
Designers
(cluster 2, n = 8)
Investors
(cluster 3, n = 3)
ANOVA
Cost
Mean 4.48 4.58 6.00 F = 2.629
S.D. 0.85 1.32 0.00 P = 0.101
Quality
Mean 6.33 6.54 6.22 F = 0.430
S.D. 0.62 0.59 0.39 P = 0.658
Delivery
Mean 6.33 6.50 7.00 F = 1.063
S.D. 0.87 0.53 0.00 P = 0.367
Flexibility [2] [1, 3] [2]
Mean 4.18 5.35 3.80 F = 3.624
S.D. 1.38 0.68 0.35 P < 0.05
Numbers in brackets indicate other groups significantl different from the cluster in the multiple comparison LSD test (P < 0.05).
of plants in this sector is primarily linked to the objec-
tives of delivery and quality, with costs and fl xibil-
ity being given relatively little importance. The larger
plants are without doubt those that afford the least rel-
ative importance to the objective of fl xibility (3.80)
compared with a mean of 4.18 for the traditionalists
and 5.35 for the designers. This might be a reflectio of
the need of smaller companies to respond to demands
made by their larger customers (some of which are in-
cluded in the investor group). Larger plants in this sec-
tor do not seem to be subject to this type of pressure.
Nevertheless, as has been previously indicated, the dif-
ferences that were found between the groups were not
between the larger factories—the investors—and the
smaller ones—the traditionalists and the designers, as
the differences between traditionalists and investors
are not statistically significant However, if the two
groups with no difference in size—traditionalists and
designers—are compared, we fin that the designers,
who are more inclined towards investment in AMT, are
also apparently more committed to fl xibility. Given
that the results obtained do not allow clear conclu-
sions to be drawn regarding any effects strategic prior-
ities might have on AMT investment, this relationship
is significan inasmuch as it might suggest that those
smaller firm that have invested in AMT to a greater
degree, i.e. the designers, have benefite from the in-
vestments by achieving greater fl xibility in their pro-
cedures which they can then use to their competitive
advantage. This relationship requires further analysis,
however.
5.2.4. Information elements and patterns of
investment
Table 15 has been drawn up to analyze this aspect
and shows that the factors that carried least relative
weight for providing information on AMT were the
plant’s own workers and, to an even lesser degree, in-
formation programs run by government departments.
This fact is quite striking, as the aeronautical sector is
considered to be a strategic industry by the Andalusian
authorities. Despite this, the companies feel that the
information they obtain from the various government
departments is not very important for gaining knowl-
edge about the advanced manufacturing technologies
that could be applied to their procedures. This might
be a reflectio of some oversight on the part of the
Authorities, mostly regional government departments,
especially when it is realized that, in some cases, the
sector is not very aware of these technologies.
For the traditionalists and the investors, the most
important factor is information obtained from other
companies, followed by information received from
suppliers. The designers, however, mostly obtain in-
formation about AMT at trades fairs and also through
their suppliers. This might reflec greater diligence on
the part of their company executives given that, as the
companies are small in size, they are more inclined
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Table 15
Information elements by group: results of ANOVA
Traditionalists
(cluster 1, n = 9)
Designers
(cluster 2, n = 8)
Investors
(cluster 3, n = 3)
ANOVA
Information from suppliers
Mean 3.12 3.56 2.33 F = 0.381
S.D. 2.35 2.02 1.15 P = 0.689
N 8 8 3
Information from workers
Mean 2.20 1.87 1.00 F = 0.749
S.D. 1.73 1.35 0.00 P = 0.489
N 8 8 3
Other companies
Mean 4.41 2.97 5.66 F = 2.194
S.D. 2.38 1.83 1.15 P = 0.144
N 8 8 3
Trades fairs
Mean 3.00 3.83 1.00 F = 1.793
S.D. 2.20 2.51 0.00 P = 0.198
N 8 8 3
Journals and magazines
Mean 2.62 3.31 1.00 F = 1.786
S.D. 2.06 1.79 0.00 P = 0.200
N 8 8 3
Government departments and agencies
Mean 1.50 1.16 1.00 F = 0.390
S.D. 1.41 0.35 0.00 P = 0.684
N 8 8 3
to invest in AMT than traditionalists. Nevertheless,
the result of greatest note is that, contrary to what
is put forward in Hypothesis 4, no difference can be
seen between the groups with respect to the relative
importance afforded to different information sources,
whereby it should be concluded that the information
sources used when investing in AMT have no special
effect on the level of investment made by the plants
in the population.
5.2.5. Catalyst elements and patterns of investment
With regard to catalyst elements, however, it can
be seen in Table 16 that the answers basically point
to one or two factors, with the others being afforded
little or no importance whatsoever. The most impor-
tant catalyst factor that drives companies to invest is
expansion. In fact, the only differences between the
various groups shown by ANOVA were with respect
to this factor, which partially confirm Hypothesis 5.
The LSD analysis indicates that there are differences
between the investor, and the traditionalist and de-
signer groups in this respect, with expansion being an
especially relevant issue for investment in AMT for
the last two. This causes us to again highlight that a
fundamental factor in this sector for investing in AMT
is the company being of a certain minimum size. As
investor plants have already reached this minimum
size, it is not a requirement for them to be going
through a process of expansion in order to make new
investments. For the other two groups, however, the
expansion process and the subsequent increase in size
of the company is fundamental if they are to have
access to said technologies. It can also be said that,
on many occasions, especially depending on the type
of activity in question, a plant will fin it difficul to
win new orders and to expand if it does not possess
the capabilities that this technology affords. It should
also be pointed out that many of the plants, even the
larger ones, made some reference to the need to invest
in order not to be excluded from the market.
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Table 16
Catalyst elements by group: results of ANOVA and LSD test
Traditionalists
(cluster 1, n = 9)
Designers
(cluster 2, n = 8)
Investors
(cluster 3, n = 3)
ANOVA
Arrival of new employee/executive
Mean 1.00 1.54 1.00 F = 1.290
S.D. 0.00 1.09 0.00 P = 0.303
N 8 8 3
Plans for expansion [3] [3] [1, 2]
Mean 5.25 4.64 1.00 F = 4.838
S.D. 1.98 2.39 0.00 P < 0.05
N 8 8 3
Rising profit
Mean 2.83 3.22 1.00 F = 1.583
S.D. 2.05 1.93 0.00 P = 0.236
N 8 8 3
Injection of outside capital
Mean 1.00 1.06 1.00 F = 0.662
S.D. 0.00 0.17 0.00 P = 0.530
N 8 8 3
Existence of skilled labor
Mean 1.75 1.37 1.00 F = 0.510
S.D. 1.38 1.06 0.00 P = 0.610
N 8 8 3
Numbers in brackets indicate other groups significantl different from the cluster in the multiple comparison LSD test (P < 0.05).
5.3. Effects of investment patterns identifie in the
sector
5.3.1. Investment patterns and integration
A one-way ANOVA was performed to test the
fourth hypothesis, the results of which can be seen
in Table 17. The results of the multiple comparison
LSD test are included in the table in brackets.
It can be seen that the degree of integration dif-
fers significantl from one cluster to another. In other
words, as expected, there is a significan difference
between the degree of integration found in the in-
vestor group of companies and those of the other two
clusters; in addition, the difference in level of inte-
Table 17
Integration by group: results of ANOVA and LSD test
Traditionalists
(cluster 1, n = 9)
Designers
(cluster 2, n = 8)
Investors
(cluster 3, n = 3)
ANOVAs
Integration [2, 3] [1, 3] [1, 2]
Mean 1.31 3.33 6.17 F = 18.290
S.D. 0.46 1.84 0.58 P < 0.001
Numbers in brackets indicate other groups significantl different from the cluster in the multiple comparison LSD test (P < 0.05).
gration between the designer and traditionalist com-
panies is equally significant Therefore, the null hy-
pothesis has to be rejected and it must be accepted
that there are differences in the degree of integration
from one investment pattern identifie in the sector to
another.
These results confir the finding of Boyer et al.
(1996). Nevertheless, whereas in the cited study dif-
ferences in integration between the traditionalist and
designer companies were not found, in our popula-
tion this difference can be clearly appreciated. This
could be due to the fact that, in our study, in addition
to the significan difference in the AMTD variable,
the difference between the means for investment in
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Table 18
Performance by group: results of ANOVA
Traditionalists
(cluster 1, n = 9)
Designers
(cluster 2, n = 8)
Investors
(cluster 3, n = 3)
ANOVA
Growth
Mean 4.94 6.00 4.50 F = 3.086
S.D. 0.84 1.39 0.00 P = 0.072
Profi
Mean 4.44 5.28 5.00 F = 1.382
S.D. 1.04 1.15 0.00 P = 0.280
manufacturing AMT is rather more marked (0.81
for the traditionalist group and 2.15 for the designer
group) than in Boyer et al. (1996) (in which means of
2.43 and 2.62, respectively, are reported). Although
this is not sufficien to be considered statistically
significant it could allow the difference in degree of
integration between the designer and the traditionalist
groups to be considered significant
5.3.2. Investment patterns and performance
On analyzing the relationship between investment
patterns and company performance, the finding show
that the differences between groups are not signif-
icant in either of the two aspects used to measure
performance; however, they are closer to being sig-
nifican in the case of growth than in profitabilit
(see Table 18).
The results obtained tend to corroborate the find
ings of Boyer et al. (1996), inasmuch as differences in
investment performance were not found between clus-
ters. The authors put forward various possible causes
to explain this result: the quality of the implementa-
tion process, eventualities related to customers and
company products, a delay between the investments
being made and the resulting improvement in perfor-
mance being felt, or the principle of equifinalit . Any
of these could, a priori, apply in our study, although
with conditions. Thus, for example, although it is true
that many of the investments analyzed were made very
recently, others had been made several years earlier,
and so the influenc of any possible delay could not be
generalized; a longitudinal study would be required
comparing the results obtained by particular compa-
nies over the course of time. Furthermore, the char-
acteristics of the population studied lead us to accept
that the relationships between the companies and their
customers/suppliers are very similar in all cases; for
this reason, the influenc this possible cause has may
not carry much weight in explaining the differences
or absence of differences in performance. Regarding
the quality of the implementation process, the results
obtained in other areas of the broader research project
suggest that the only factor significantl related to
better investment performance is the training of the
personnel involved, although this relationship is not
observed when considering overall company perfor-
mance. Finally, several authors have emphasized the
importance the principle of equifinalit has for typolo-
gies and taxonomies with respect to corporate strat-
egy. Many studies have come to the conclusion that
technology per se does not correlate with an improve-
ment in performance (Krafcik, 1988; Matthews and
Foo, 1991; Boyer et al., 1997; Swamidass and Kotha,
1998; Cagliano and Spina, 2000; Kotha and
Swamidass, 2000). The results obtained in our study
support the principle of equifinalit , i.e. that various
different paths or strategies followed by a company
could lead to identical results.
5.3.3. Investment patterns and difficultie in the
adoption and implementation process
With regard to the eighth hypothesis, it was ex-
pected that the degree of complexity of the equipment
installed, and the amount of previous experience com-
panies had with large-scale investments would in some
way be reflecte in the factors that the different plants
considered to have most hampered the adoption and
implementation process. The ANOVA results shown
in Table 19 demonstrate, however, that there is no
significan relationship between groups and specifi
difficulties This means that Hypothesis 8 should be
rejected.
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Table 19
Difficultie by group: results of ANOVA
Traditionalists
(cluster 1, n = 9)
Designers
(cluster 2, n = 8)
Investors
(cluster 3, n = 3)
ANOVA
Lack of skilled labor
Mean 3.28 5.47 2.76 F = 2.831
S.D. 2.26 2.17 1.32 P = 0.089
N 8 8 3
Loss of fl xibility
Mean 1.00 1.25 1.56 F = 1.095
S.D. 0.00 0.71 0.98 P = 0.358
N 8 8 3
Equipment breaking down
Mean 2.07 2.53 2.20 F = 0.159
S.D. 1.23 2.19 0.17 P = 0.854
N 8 8 3
Reorganization of departments
Mean 2.71 2.62 2.76 F = 0.011
S.D. 1.64 1.59 1.32 P = 0.989
N 8 8 3
Reticence amongst employees
Mean 2.08 2.27 1.00 F = 1.224
S.D. 1.05 1.51 0.00 P = 0.320
N 8 8 3
Reticence amongst executives
Mean 1.46 1.00 1.00 F = 2.097
S.D. 0.73 0.00 0.00 P = 0.155
N 8 8 3
Difficultie with evaluation
Mean 1.91 2.28 2.46 F = 0.149
S.D. 1.00 2.42 0.40 P = 0.863
N 8 8 3
Difficultie with performance measurement
Mean 1.71 1.83 3.13 F = 1.423
S.D. 0.95 1.56 0.98 P = 0.272
N 7 8 3
Difficultie with financin
Mean 3.37 1.96 1.00 F = 1.582
S.D. 2.56 2.07 0.00 P = 0.236
N 8 8 3
We do believe that there is a series of circumstances
of note, however. It should firstl be noted that none of
the means that the factors achieved in any of the three
groups are overly high, and on hardly any occasion
is the middle value of the scale reached. It can be de-
duced from this that investor plants have not come up
against any insurmountable problems. Nevertheless,
the difficultie caused by a lack of skilled labor should
be highlighted, especially for the factories in the
designer group. With quite a low P level (P = 0.089),
however, these differences are not significan in sta-
tistical terms. Even so it can be ascertained that it is
the smallest factories with the highest levels of in-
vestment in design and manufacturing AMT, in other
words, the designers, who most suffer from the lack
of skilled labor (5.47 points on a scale of 7). As the
equipment found in these factories is as complex as
that in the traditionalist companies, this difficult
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may arise out of the need for said equipment to be
integrated; it should not be forgotten that the level of
activity integration in designer plants is significantl
higher than in traditionalist factories. The fundamen-
tal differences that set the traditionalist companies
apart from the other two groups are in the funding of
investments, which could at one and the same time
explain why they are the companies with the smallest
investments. The fact that this cannot be seen to be
true in the case of the designers eliminates the possi-
bility that it is simply a collateral effect of size. Fi-
nally, the investor plants consider the main difficult
in the adoption and implementation process to be in
the gauging of the performance of the investment. We
believe that this circumstance cannot be explained by
smaller companies having an ability to evaluate and
gauge the performance of investments more easily,
but that larger companies are more aware of the diffi
culty that carrying out both processes correctly entails
when intangible factors are taken into account.
6. Conclusions and future lines of research
The empirical analysis that was conducted has en-
abled us to establish a taxonomy of three groups of
companies that differ from each other in accordance
with their investments in the three different types of
AMT, which hints at different technological strategies.
Plants in the sector under study have been identifie
as traditionalists, designers and investors and are also
differentiated in size, degree of integration and type
of activity. In general, the traditionalists are smaller
companies with relatively limited investments in AMT
and a low degree of integration, which do not under-
take machining work; the designers are also smaller
companies but with relatively high investments in de-
sign AMT and an intermediate degree of integration,
which do undertake machining; the investors are larger
plants with the highest levels of investment in all three
types of AMT and with a high degree of integration.
On the basis of the results, no clear conclusions
can be drawn regarding any influenc competitive
priorities might have on investments, as no clear re-
lationship is discernible. Although this is not the firs
time that no relationship has been observed between
strategy and investments, it is, nevertheless, important
if we bear in mind that in previous studies evidence
has been found that indicates that a failure to align
investment and strategy could be one of the reasons
for heavier investment in AMT not being reflecte in
greater performance (Kotha and Swamidass, 2000).
The only clearly significan difference that can be seen
is between the designers and the other two groups,
and this with respect to the degree of priority given to
fl xibility as an objective. However, it remains to be
determined whether or not this relationship really im-
plies a reorientation of strategy after the acquisition of
AMT with the consequent reorientation of the capabil-
ities that these new technologies provide. The opinion
that the relationship between corporate strategy and
investment in technology is inherently dynamic in
both directions has been expressed by several authors
in recent years (Schroeder et al., 1995; Clark, 1996;
Banerjee, 2000). It is logical to consider that the ex-
ploitation of newly-acquired AMT will generate new
capabilities that would require pertinent changes to be
made to the company’s previous competitive strategy.
In this context, companies lacking AMT would have
fewer strategic options and a narrower scope of ac-
tion; if companies that do acquire AMT do not have
a well-define strategic framework for their business,
the options opened up by AMT may go unrecognized.
This could lead them to opt for an inefficien course of
action, failing to develop the new capabilities available
to the greatest extent and failing to take advantage of
potential competitive advantages. Despite these con-
siderations, empirical evidence for this relationship is
still scant. This is due to the fact that, on the one hand,
the idea has only very recently been put forward that
the technology employed, as an internal component
of an organization, might act to inspire its strategy
(Parthasarthy and Sethi, 1992), and, on the other, many
companies, particularly the smaller ones, do not de-
liberately develop any kind of strategic planning, thus
making observation of changes in strategy difficult
Furthermore, differences in plant performance
found between the groups are, in general terms, mini-
mal, as in other studies (Boyer et al., 1996; Swamidass
and Kotha, 1998; Cagliano and Spina, 2000). This
would support the principle of equifinality—th view
that for any company, different paths or strategies
exist that could lead to identical results. However, it
could also be indicative of what has been previously
suggested: that a lack of alignment of plant strategy
and the type of AMT investment made might lead to
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the improvement expected from the investment not
being fully achieved.
The identificatio of an investors group that is com-
prised of the three largest plants in the population
bears witness to the importance of the size variable for
explaining investments in the sector, as has been the
case with all previous studies on AMT investment tax-
onomies, where this relationship is likewise present.
The groups that make the heaviest investments are the
ones comprised of the biggest companies. Neverthe-
less, the fact that the smaller plants and companies in
the population that was analyzed are spread between
different groups suggests that size cannot be the only
variable that affects the grouping process. The fact is
that when it comes to investing in the sector under
analysis, the crucial variables are the size of a plant
and the activity it conducts. However, the reason why
differences cannot be seen in other studies with re-
spect to activity might be that a large enough vari-
ety of activities had not been taken into consideration.
Despite the fact that plants in different sectors were
considered, they all conducted identical activities. Our
analysis has been of a single sector, but we go into the
specifi activities conducted in detail.
Nonetheless, on their own these two factors per se
cannot explain all the differences found between the
groups. Once a clear difference in competitive prior-
ities has been ruled out, there is one factor that has
shown itself to be significant whether the company is
in the process of expansion or not. However, this un-
doubtedly takes us back indirectly to the question of
size.
It is true that the population analyzed in this sec-
toral and regional research study comprises plants con-
ducting their activities exclusively or mainly in the
aeronautical sector and in a very specifi geographical
region. The findings should be highly explanatory for
the population as long as we accept that the data that
was collected is accurate as a result of the steps that
were taken to prevent certain factors affecting it, such
as the degree to which it could be easily understood,
and the level of attention or mood of the interviewee. It
would not in principle be correct to consider extrapo-
lating the results to any other sample or population and
it was never intended for the statistical analysis to be
inferred in a general way. On the contrary, it could be
said that this contribution relies, rather on the possibil-
ity of a logical extrapolation to circumstances where
the finding might apply, and researchers can judge
whether the particular finding would be valid. How-
ever, from the characteristics presented by the groups,
it can be stated that the patterns of behavior shown
with respect to investments in AMT in the sector are
similar to those detected in other sectors and geo-
graphical areas; hence, one can have confidenc in the
consistency of certain patterns beyond geographical
and sectoral bounds. With respect to this question, an
in-depth study to confir the existence of a technology
strategy that is heavily geared towards design AMTs
would seem to be necessary. Such a strategy has pre-
viously been identifie (Boyer et al., 1996) and clearly
re-emerges in this study, although it was not evident
in the study carried out by Jonsson (2000). Boyer’s
(1999) more recent findings which suggested that de-
signer and generalist companies follow different devel-
opment patterns, support the existence of this strategy.
In our case, a longitudinal analysis would help shed
more light on the evolution of investment patterns in
the sector and on other aspects, too, such as whether
the benefit of AMT for company performance can be
perceived more clearly in the longer term or whether
the plants that did not invest in AMT have disappeared
or been absorbed; three traditionalist plants had al-
ready been bought out by larger Spanish or overseas
companies by the end of 2002. There have been con-
siderable changes in the sector since the start of this
research. During 2000 and for most of 2001, the ex-
cellent prospects for the sector in Andalusia—riding
on the back of the buoyant situation of the sector
in Europe, with satisfactory growth anticipated, and
in the midst of restructuring as a result of the cre-
ation of EADS—produced a number of changes in its
make-up. Several other companies have opened plants
in the region and it was hoped that more would follow,
given the advantages offered (including, for example,
low manufacturing costs, the availability of skilled la-
bor, the tradition of aeronautical activity in the region,
good links with the north of Europe, subsidies from the
EU, being classifie as a zone 1, and the fact that the
CASA fina assembly plant is located in Seville). In
addition, many companies had considerably increased
their workforce and sales in the expectation that there
would be a prolonged increase in workload. However,
the circumstances surrounding the sector have altered
dramatically since the terrorist attacks of 11 Septem-
ber 2001 in the USA; for this reason, the results of
27
such a longitudinal analysis could similarly be con-
siderably affected.
On the other hand, it has not been possible to estab-
lish any statistically-significan relationship between
the other factors that were considered in the study and
the groups that were identifie in the population being
analyzed. Given the previously-mentioned limitations
to the population, however, we are of the opinion that
some of these issues are worthy of a more in-depth
analysis with more general populations and samples.
Finally, there is one other aspect that has arisen out
of our research which, although not directly related to
the goals of the study, is, in our opinion, of special in-
terest. As has been explained in the methodology, the
scales of measurement utilized have been validated in
previous studies as being highly reliable, and this has
also been corroborated in our study in most cases. Nev-
ertheless, it has also been confirme that the scales of
measurement for strategic operations objectives, again
clearly validated in other research, have not been found
suitable for our purposes in this study. It is therefore
considered that an in-depth analysis to make these
scales appropriate for different sectors and their pri-
orities is a topic that merits further investigation.
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